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Love – According to Simone de Beauvoir 





Love, a topic among philosophers since Plato, has a prominent role in Simone de Beauvoir’s 
philosophy. According to Beauvoir, love is a universal human experience with the possibility 
of bringing the highest form of freedom, joy, and fulfillment, as well as grave misery, 
dependency, and exploitation. Beauvoir discusses various kinds of personal love in her work, 
including maternal love, lesbian love, friendship, and heterosexual love. In her portrayal of 
heterosexual love, she draws a distinction between two main types, inauthentic and authentic. 
Authentic love is “founded on mutual recognition of two liberties,” always freely chosen and 
sustained. It requires that the lovers maintain their individuality, while at the same time 
acknowledging each other’s differences. Inauthentic love is founded on inequality between 
the sexes, on submission and domination. It prevents both women and men from 
experiencing freedom, comradeship and the joy of loving. This distinction is, I argue, 
applicable also to other types of love. Unlike Sartre, Beauvoir believes authentic love is 
possible. I contrast their respective views. Towards the end, I consider Beauvoir’s idea of 
authentic love in light of her concept of moral freedom, and argue that Beauvoir’s authentic 
love foreshadows feminist notion of “relational autonomy.”  
 
1. Inauthentic Love 
Beauvoir portrays inauthentic love in a highly gendered fashion. “The word ‘love’ has not at 
all the same meaning for both sexes,” she writes in The Second Sex, “and this is a source of 
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the grave misunderstandings that separate them” (TSS 683/LDS II:477). In a patriarchal 
society, both sexes will experience inauthentic love. Although Beauvoir focuses more on how 
this phenomenon is manifested by women, a close reading also reveals the obstacles that 
prevent men from experiencing authentic love (Mundy 2015).  
 One of the most salient expectations with regard to women’s way of expressing love 
is the demand made for their devotion and self-sacrifice. In Diary of a Philosophy Student 
(1926–27), the 18-year-old Beauvoir – who at the time believed she would marry her cousin 
Jacques Champigneulle – is torn between her passion for Jacques and her desire to study. The 
self-sacrifice she thought would be required of her in marriage seemed impossible to 
reconcile with studying and living an autonomous life: “[H]e will simply introduce me to his 
life, but nothing will be changed. As for me, I am gambling all of myself!” (2006, 135).  
 The manifestation and consequences of these gendered expectations of love are 
analyzed and discussed in The Second Sex. Men, even the most passionate of lovers, 
Beauvoir points out:  
 
never abandon themselves completely […] they remain sovereign subjects; the woman they 
love is merely one value among others; they want to integrate her into their existence, not 
submerge their entire existence in her. By contrast, love for the woman is a total abdication 
for the benefit of a master. (TSS 683/LDS II:477–8) 
 
These expectations permeate human life in all its aspects; norms, practices, and interactions. 
They also inform how women and men perceive themselves, as well as how they judge and 
what they demand of the opposite sex. In a traditional marriage, for example, women are 
expected to become part of the man’s world by taking his name, joining his religion, 
following him where he wants to live; “she is annexed to her husband’s universe” (TSS 
442/LDS II:199).  
This situation, and the norms pertaining to it, has a profound influence on the 
character and behavior of both genders. What is commonly seen as typical for women – such 
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as “her convictions, values, wisdom, morality, tastes and behavior – is explained by her 
situation” (TSS 661/LDS II:451). Beauvoir also expounds the gendered expressions of desires 
by way of social constructions: “he wants her to be the Other […] she makes herself object” 
(TSS 653/LDS II:441). A woman in love is like a “praying mantis” (Beauvoir 2015a, 76).1  
 Women’s love construed as a demand for self-sacrifice and devotion does not pertain 
to romantic love alone. As mothers, daughters, and nurses, the demands are the same. “From 
childhood woman is repeatedly told she is made to bear children, and the praises of 
motherhood are sung” (TSS 532/LDS II:299). Motherhood is said to be one of her “sacred 
rights” and her “ultimate end,” and many mothers are guilty of what she calls “masochistic 
devotion.” They turn “themselves into slaves of their offspring,” and “they give up all 
pleasure, all personal life, enabling them to assume the role of victim: and from the sacrifices 
they derive the right to the deny the child all independence” (TSS, 567–9, 559/LDS II:339–41, 
329).  
  Owing to the all-consuming focus on the other, it is not only the loss of a romantic 
love that causes a strong reaction in women. The loss of any object of her devotion will lead 
her to despair. “The mother,” Beauvoir writes in Pyrrhus and Cineas (1944), “who 
contemplates her grown son, like the volunteer nurse who contemplates her cured patients, 
says with regret, ‘You no longer need me!’ This regret often takes the form of a reproach” 
(Beauvoir 2004, 118). Women’s ways of expressing love for other people – be it a lover, a 
child, or a patient – is marked by the affinity for devotion and self-sacrifice.  
 This act of surrendering resembles religious behavior. The religious woman and the 
woman in love both long to dedicate and submit themselves to the other. In its most extreme 
form, inauthentic feminine love finds its clearest expression in the love of the religious 
mystic for her celestial spouse (TSS 709/LDS II:508). The religious woman who tortures her 
flesh, “drinking the water in which she had just washed the leper’s hands and feet” and 
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cleaning the “sick person’s vomit with her tongue” (TSS 714–15/LDS II:514–15), expresses 
her love of Jesus and her neighbor. Apparently, she performs these deeds with pleasure. Such 
extremes could be pathological, Beauvoir points out, “[b]ut there is this inextricable 
confusion on many devotees between man and God” (TSS 710/LDS II:510). In behaving like 
this, the religious woman “tries to connect with the lover using the usual technique of a 
woman in love: annihilation” (TSS 714/LDS II:514).2 
 This gendered behavior has been explained by asserting that altruism (Schopenhauer 
1851), masochism, passivity, and narcissism (Freud  1995[1924]; Deutsch 1944), are 
naturally occurring traits of the female character. Beauvoir rejects gender essentialism. The 
way women express love has nothing to do “with a law of nature,” Beauvoir declares, 
whether it is expressed as a tendency to be more other-regarding than men or to enjoy pain 
inflicted by others: “It is the difference in their situations that is reflected in the conceptions 
men and women have of love” (TSS 684/LDS II:478). Let us take a closer look at how 
Beauvoir explains the behavior of women in (inauthentic) love. 
  Initially, women and men share the same desire for transcendence. This desire plays a 
prominent role in Beauvoir’s philosophy, and she views it as a non-gendered human trait. To 
Beauvoir, a person is by definition transcendence: “No existent ever renounces his 
transcendence, especially when he stubbornly disavows it,” she says (TSS 469/LDS II:229). It 
is through transcendence, through the free choice of projects and interaction with other free 
beings, that individuals can achieve a meaningful  and ethical life (Pettersen 2015). In most 
cultures, however, women’s freedom to transcend has been, and still is, limited by her 
situation. Women usually do not see themselves as their male partners’ equal, nor do men 
typically view them as such. What a woman aspires to, by devoting herself to her beloved, is 
a union with the superior being, an alliance with the person having the power and possibility 
to transcend. This brings her, via another, closer to transcendence. Not only does this 
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explanation elucidate woman’s devotion and self-sacrifice towards her male partner or god, it 
also sheds light on maternal love. Through her son, the mother can experience transcendence:  
 
The house she did not build, the countries she did not explore, the books she did not read, he 
will give to her. Through him she will possess the world: but on the condition that she 
possesses her son. (TSS 560/LDS II:331) 
 
Not so with the daughter. As the daughter is not a member of the “chosen caste,” the mother 
“seeks a double in her. She projects onto her all the ambiguity of her relationship with 
herself; and when the alterity of this alter ego affirms itself, she feels betrayed” (TSS 561/LDS 
II:332). Through this explanation, Beauvoir rejects traditional explanations according to 
which females by nature have submissive character traits. The expression of inauthentic love 
is a response to women’s subordinated position, to being confined to immanence; it is a 
strategy to cope with oppression.3 For many women, love is the “only opportunity” to 
“enlarge or overturn their universe” (Beauvoir 2015b, 100).  
Women’s attempt to gain transcendence through another person explains another 
behavioral tendency of women in love. That is her persistent attempt to get the beloved to 
dedicate himself completely to her. The woman seeks a timeless union with him, and 
demands of him that his feelings are absolute and eternal. The reason women so passionately 
desire to lock the man into a timeless union is precisely why they want to devote themselves 
to him in the first place. A union with a man represents a way out of the immanence in which 
she is trapped, by way of an indirect transcendence. This is also why a woman in love is 
ready to serve and satisfy his needs. By making herself a necessary part of his life, “she will 
be integrated into his existence, she will be part of his value, his worth, she will be justified” 
(TSS 691/LDS II:486). This is why the loving woman becomes “a jailer.” It is also why the 
mother clings to her children with a “tyrannical devotion” that obstructs their independence 
(TSS 560–2/LDS II:331–4). A loving woman wants to imprison a free being, bolt free 
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existence onto her immanence, so that her contact with transcendence will be secured. Of 
course, this is destined to fail; a free being cannot be owned (TSS 698/LDS II:495). 
Her desire to achieve complete union with the loved one through devotion, implies 
that the woman “lets her own world founder in contingence; she lives in his universe” writes 
Beauvoir (TSS 693/LDS II:489). Herein lies one of the many paradoxes of inauthentic 
romantic love. The woman in love seeks the approval of her being as something 
irreplaceable, a confirmation that her life has a unique meaning. Nevertheless, in order to 
gain this approval, she eradicates her individuality and aspires to become one with her 
partner, eliminating as a result the differences between the two. This is what eventually kills 
the love between them. On Beauvoir’s view, it is precisely the uniqueness of the other that 
draws the two together in the first place, and also what can prolong and uphold the attraction 
(Beauvoir 2015a, 79; 2015b, 101). However, in her attempt to become one with the beloved, 
she makes herself part of the other’s facticity. The sexual act is “no longer an intersubjective 
experience where each goes beyond himself, but rather a kind of mutual masturbation” (TSS 
467/LDS II:226–7). The sexual relationship becomes inauthentic and “bestial” (TSS 458/LDS 
II:216).  
 Not only does her attempt to become one destroy their love, such union is also 
unethical in Beauvoir’s philosophy. A woman who devotes herself completely to her partner 
does not take responsibility for herself and her own life – as Beauvoir’s existentialist ethics 
requires (Pettersen 2007, 2015). Women’s self-denial and subjugation are not entirely 
positive from a male perspective either. Since the woman, on entering into the relationship, 
adores and idolizes him, she does not see his vulnerability or the threat to his projects. She is 
not his companion, and he is not allowed to fail (TSS 695/LDS II:491–2). But eventually, 
when she discovers his fallibility, she begins to despise him. Everything he does from now on 
is wrong: “The chevalier who embarks on new feats of prowess offends his lady; but she 
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scorns him if he stays seated at her feet” (TSS 698/LDS II:698). This is another of the painful 
paradoxes of inauthentic love: a captive god is shorn of his divinity (TSS 698/LDS II:495). 
Although privileged, neither can the man in an inauthentic romantic relationship realize his 
full human potential as a free being without an equal partner. He will not be “healed of his 
egoistical pride,” nor experience self-negation and devotion (Beauvoir 2015a, 78), nor the 
benefits of comradeship. In addition, if his masculine identity and dominant position are 
dependent on women’s subordination, he is not free (Gunnarsson 2013, 165; Mundy 2015). If 
the man in love is governed by conventional masculine ideals, he too lives an inauthentic and 
unethical life, unable to experience authentic love.  
 The lack of equality between women and men also manifests itself in the way 
jealousy is experienced and expressed. Men are jealous simply because of their “will to 
exclusive power,” writes Beauvoir. A sleeping woman does not represent a threat to him. She 
belongs to nobody” (TSS 696–7/LDS II:493). But to women, even a sleeping man is a threat. 
Why? Because when he sleeps, he doesn’t think about her (TSS 698/LDS II:493–4). Whatever 
he looks at that is not her, she experiences as threatening:  
[A]s soon as he looks at something other than her, he frustrates her; everything he sees, he 
steals from her; far from him, she is dispossessed both of herself and of the world; even 
seated at her side, reading, writing, he abandons her, he betrays her. (TSS 696/LDS II:493) 
 
The woman who tries to preserve her own transcendence by surrendering to a man, is 
witnessing her transcendence not being brought out into the world every time he is not aware 
of her (TSS 698/LDS II:495). As he is her link to the world, she sinks into immanence without 
his attention. 
 Beauvoir’s grim description of inauthentic love is essentially a portrayal of how 
heterosexual love manifests itself on patriarchal terms of human interaction. It is described in 
Beauvoir’s philosophy as a distorted, degenerate, and unethical form of love, doomed to fail. 
Traditional marriages commonly epitomize inauthentic love since the relation between the 
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spouses in such relationships is based on domination as opposed to companionship, and 
because the other is not recognized as an irreplaceable, unique being. Additionally, if the 
marriage is not freely chosen and continually renewed, this further contributes to the 
marriage’s unethical arrangement. Consequently, adultery can sometimes manifest authentic 
love and moral freedom. 
 Lesbian love can take many forms and also be inauthentic, but nevertheless holds a 
greater potential for overcoming the patriarchal structures entrenched in traditional 
heterosexual love. Two women in love will not so easily be trapped in conventional 
femininity. In a culture where femininity “means mutilation” (TSS 421/LDS II:175), lesbian 
love allows women to “free themselves of the chains attached to femininity” (TSS 424/LDS 
II:178), to experience love without becoming the Other. This is precisely why it provokes; 
lesbian love acknowledges women as sovereign subjects and consequently challenges the 
gender hierarchy: “As an ‘erotic perversion’ feminine homosexuality elicits smiles; but 
inasmuch as it implies a way of life, it provokes scorn or scandal” (TSS 434/LDS II:189).  
However, inauthentic love is not the only form of love possible between women and 
men. Authentic love between the sexes is achievable – but only when they acknowledge each 
other as equals and as unique. Hence, while inauthentic love can be described as patriarchal, 
authentic love can be labeled post-patriarchal since sexism must be eradicated for authentic 
relationships to flourish.  
 
2. Authentic Love 
Authentic love contains two components that are missing in the inauthentic version. First, 
there is mutual recognition of each other’s differences; second there is the mutual recognition 
of each other’s equality. Aspiring to both difference and equality might sound like a 
contradiction, but it is actually in harmony with Beauvoir’s existentialist ontology, which 
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sees ambiguity as part of the human condition (Beauvoir 1976, 7–8). “Human nature is only 
worth its salt when it brings together these two natures,” writes Beauvoir, and “love given 
and love received” is the “most powerful aid in bringing this paradoxical synthesis” (2015a, 
77). Let us inspect these two significant features of authentic love. 
 
2.1. Recognition of differences 
 “An authentic love,” writes Beauvoir, “should take on the other’s contingence, that is, his 
lacks, limitations, and originary gratuitousness; it would claim to be not a salvation but an 
inter-human relation” (TSS 694/LDS II:491). It is vital to perceive love as a human 
interaction. If the individuality of one of the partners – usually the woman – is curbed, if she 
is regarded as a mere extension of her male partner, she cannot be loved for her uniqueness. 
Sexuality in relationships where the individual differences have been eradicated is unethical, 
she writes. This is because physical love in such relationships is not justified by individuals, 
but by God or society, and then “the relationship of the two partners is no more than a bestial 
one” (TSS 458/LDS II:216). Consequently, “an authentically moral erotic life” is possible 
only when the other is recognized as a unique individual. Here we see exactly what 
differentiates authentic and inauthentic physical love. Authentic physical love is based on the 
lovers’ full consent and on their acknowledgment of each other’s uniqueness. Inauthentic 
physical love – typical of traditional marriage – gives sex “an instrumental, thus degrading 
character” as they are doomed to know each other in their generality, that is, as bodies, not as 
persons (TSS 465/LDS II:225).  
 Failing to recognize the individual differences not only makes sexuality unethical, it 
is, according to Beauvoir, also the biggest turn-off in a romantic relationship. The reason is 
that “[e]roticism is a movement towards the Other, and this is its essential character; but 
within the couple, spouses become, for each other, the Same; no exchange is possible 
between them anymore, no giving, no conquest” (TSS 467/LDS II:226). It is the lack of 
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individuality, the absence of mutual recognition of each other’s uniqueness, which, according 
to Beauvoir, kills the traditional marriage. Sexuality, romance, and love are drowned in 
boredom when one of the partner’s perspectives and opinions are mere repetitions of the 
other’s. Authentic love therefore requires both maintaining their individuality and self-
respect, and acknowledging the differences between them. 
 
2.2. Recognition of equality 
A necessary but insufficient condition to achieve true love, is for the individuals to 
acknowledge their differences. Additionally, they must also recognize each other as equals. 
To recognize the other as an equal is to acknowledge the other as a free being. Only then can 
love for the woman, as for the man, become “the source of life and not a mortal danger” (TSS 
708/LDS II:708): 
Authentic love must be founded on reciprocal recognition of two freedoms; each lover would 
then experience himself as himself and as the other; neither would abdicate transcendence, 
they would not mutilate themselves; together they would reveal values and ends in the world. 
(TSS 706/LDS II:505) 
 
In an authentic love relationship, each party must choose to respect their own freedom as well 
as that of the other, Beauvoir emphasizes. By respecting the other’s freedom, one refrains 
from dominating, controlling, and suppressing the other. But equally important; by respecting 
one’s own freedom, one rejects a submissive role and refrains from seeking to devote oneself 
to another – as is the case in inauthentic love. For a woman to achieve authentic love, she 
must essentially exist as pour-soi – for-herself – as men do. This means that she must be 
financially independent, “project herself toward her own ends,” and transcend herself towards 
the world without using a man as an agent (TSS 707/LDS II:506).  
 Authentic love is (ideally) non-possessive and non-submissive. Consequently, the 
differences between the parties, such as gender, race, class, and age, will not allow one to 
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enjoy, unjustifiably, more freedom, power, and possibilities than the other – or to renounce 
one’s own freedom. Moreover, authentic love is always freely chosen, sustained, and 
voluntarily renewed. Free, renewed, and reciprocal recognition is a prominent characteristic 
of authentic love, and is exactly what makes this, rather than inauthentic love, ethical. 
Authentic love expresses moral freedom. Or, in the words of Nancy Bauer: 
 
genuine love is an expression of the highest of moral laws: when I love another person 
genuinely I both exercise my existential freedom and evince the highest respect for the 
freedom of other, on which, I understand, my own freedom rests. (Bauer 2001, 164–5)  
 
Regardless of gender, race, and class, authentic love requires a reciprocated recognition of 
both differences and equality. But is this applicable to maternal love? As the mother–child 
relationship is asymmetrical, a full-blown reciprocity cannot take place. Nevertheless, 
maternal love can also be authentic. First, “since maternal love has nothing natural about it” 
“the relation of parents to children, like that of the spouse, must be freely chosen” (TSS 566–
7/LDS II:338–9). Second, the mother must respect her own freedom, as well as her child’s. 
Consequently, she will not justify her existence through motherhood alone, but must also 
pursue other freely chosen projects. Nor will she hamper the independence of her children, 
instead aiming to create a situation from which “the child’s freedom can transcend” (TSS 
568/LDS II:340).  
 
It would obviously be better for the child if his mother were a complete person and not a 
mutilated one, a woman who finds in her work and her relations with the group a self-
accomplishment she could not attain through his tyranny; and it would be preferable also for 
the child to be left infinitely less to his parents than he is now, that his studies and 
amusements take place with other children under the control of adults whose links with him 
are only impersonal and dispassionate (TSS 568/LDS II:340) 
 
Obviously, authentic love requires more than mutual recognition – which Beauvoir also terms 
moral freedom. Whether or not the agents are capable of recognizing the freedom of self and 
others, is also dependent on the situation. The social and economic circumstances shape 
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people’s understanding of love and impact if and how their desires can be carried out. If, for 
example, birth control and abortion are inaccessible, if same-sex relationships are forbidden, 
if dominant cultural myths depict women as submissive and men as sexually aggressive, love 
will be deformed. In addition to reciprocated recognition, authentic love also requires 
concrete freedom. Concrete freedom refers to the measure of freedom people possess in a 
particular situation. Whether we enjoy political rights, have sufficient material resources to 
exercise our freedom, or live instead in "bad faith," these situational attributes affect the 
agent’s capacity to make free choices and act thereon also when it comes to love.  
 
3. Beauvoir’s View on Love Contrasted with Sartre’s 
The publication of Beauvoir’s Diary has been an invaluable contribution to Beauvoir 
scholarship, in particular with regard to the debate about the influence of Jean-Paul Sartre, 
and the exchange of ideas between them. What Diary demonstrates is that central ideas of her 
later philosophy are prefigured in these very early writings – several years before she even 
met Sartre. A close reading of Beauvoir’s works shows that the position she developed on 
topics related to love departs distinctly from Sartre’s.  
 As already mentioned, Beauvoir is indeed conscious in Diary of the demand that 
women sacrifice their own interests and autonomy on entering into a traditional heterosexual 
relationship. In addition to these early reflections of what she would later term inauthentic 
love, she also foreshadows the type of love she would term authentic. The love she aspires to 
in Diary, “is not a subordination, and leaves the one who loves the care of seeking his own 
directions, of leading an independent, individual life” (Beauvoir 2006, 76). The idea that 
authentic love must contain the apparently ambiguous element of difference and equality is 
expressed in her ideas about a future partner for whom she will not have to give up her own 
life: “One must love him in this very difference without seeing it as an inferiority, which 
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would be unjust for oneself” (2006, 77). Since the two individuals in love are separate and 
different, they cannot merge and be one – even though they might reach out for it. It would be 
“absurd,” because the “union of the souls” is “impossible” (2006, 76). Nevertheless, even if a 
complete union cannot be achieved, the two lovers need not live their lives completely 
separated. Beauvoir seeks a middle way between being merged and being divided: the lovers 
can live parallel lives. Envisaging a marriage that differs from the traditional one, the 18-
year-old Beauvoir writes: “They are going to continue their life, side by side, but outwardly 
far from one another, and this, whatever their love may be, if they evolve in parallel, is 
perfect” (2006, 78). This echoes Beauvoir’s later portrayal of authentic love, as, for instance, 
in The Ethics of Ambiguity, where she writes: “To love him genuinely is to love him in his 
otherness and in that freedom by which he escapes” (1976, 67). It also resembles The Second 
Sex’s claim that love must be “founded on the recognition of two freedoms” (TSS 520/LDS 
II:286), as well as her assertion in “It’s about time women put on a new face on love” (1950), 
that “the miracle achieved by love alone” will only happen if one can “cherish in the 
individual what gives him his difference and still accord him the universal rights that are 
every human being’s” (2015a, 77). Throughout Beauvoir’s entire output “it is this love that is 
the most complete relationship possible with another person” (2015a, 78). 
 According to what Sartre writes in Being and Nothingness (1943), such love is not 
possible.4 There are two fundamental attitudes toward the other, he contends. One is “to 
transcend the Other’s transcendence,” the other is “to incorporate that transcendence within 
me without removing from it its character as transcendence” (Sartre 2005, 385). The two 
attitudes conflict. In fact, as he himself claims, “each attempt is the death of the other” (2005, 
385). For Sartre, our freedom as individuals is at risk whenever we encounter others, 
including – or especially – others with whom we form a romantic relationship. The two 
attitudes toward concrete others imply that love takes place within a subject–object 
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relationship involving an unavoidable battle over who is to occupy the role of object or of 
subject. The reason one jeopardizes one’s freedom in relations with others is that one has to 
deal, intellectually, with the structure of being-for-the-other – which, in a romantic 
relationship, means one of the two has to become an object.  
 When two are in love they will attempt to adjust to the beloved’s look, by trying to 
look at the beloved the way the beloved looks at them. In doing so, people in love surrender 
their uniqueness and renounce their freedom. They will try to seduce the beloved to love 
them as something they are not – which, to Sartre, is an act of bad faith. If the one does not 
submit, and both look at each other, “the struggle of two freedoms confronted as freedoms” 
will be out in the open (Sartre 2005, 401). There will be a battle between the two freedoms 
until it is established which is the subject and which the object in this relationship. For Sartre, 
there is no way of transcending the subject–object relationship; either you lose your own 
freedom or you deny the other theirs. In fact, the problem of being-for-the other “remains 
without solution” (2005, 398).  
 To love the other as a freedom and at the same time remain a free being, is not 
achievable with Sartre’s framework because one cannot love another without falling into a 
relationship of object to subject. Although Beauvoir is certainly aware of relationships 
dominated by the conflict between subject and object, she still believes in the possibility of a 
relationship in which both consider the other as subject: “The conflict can be overcome by 
the free recognition of each individual in the other, each one positing both itself and the other 
as object and as subject in a reciprocal movement” (TSS 159/LDS I:232). This is what 
authentic love requires. Within the framework of Beauvoir’s ethics, authentic love exists 
when both have achieved moral freedom, while in Sartre’s Being and Nothingness only 
inauthentic love is possible. 
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 To explain the differences between Beauvoir’s and Sartre’s respective views on 
romantic love, we need to look at their different ontologies. Sartre’s ontology is pessimistic in 
its view of human relationships. Others are essentially hostile and antagonistic, a threat to my 
freedom. Unlike Sartre, Beauvoir does not believe our relationships are always antagonistic. 
Nor does she believe that being with others necessarily has to be a struggle between two 
minds, each seeking to dominate the other. For Beauvoir, a human being is present in the 
world as a being connected with others. In her own words: “I concern others and they 
concern me. There we have an irreducible truth. The me–others relationship is as indissoluble 
as the subject–object relationship” (Beauvoir 1976, 72). In addition to not seeing being-in-
the-world as a fundamentally antagonistic state vis-à-vis others, Beauvoir does not 
understand individual humans as separate from others’ being-in-the world. For Beauvoir, 
being is my-and-your-being-in the world, it is our being-in-the-world – it is being-with 
(Mitsein) (TSS 17/LDS I:32). Where Sartre’s ontology is individualistic, Beauvoir’s is 
relational (Pettersen 2008; 2010). 
 Another relevant difference between Beauvoir and Sartre is the fact that Beauvoir 
emphasizes the ambiguity of the human condition far more than he does. For Beauvoir it is 
both-and, not either-or. As a result, she does not dichotomize to the same extent as Sartre 
(Bergoffen 1999). Sartre’s dichotomous approach in his analysis of our perceptions of others 
– as either subject or object, unfree or free (at the cost of an other’s freedom) – does not leave 
much room for harmonious relationships in which the lovers can acknowledge each other’s 
freedom. In Beauvoir’s ontology, humans are both mind and body, both entirely free and 
restricted, both separate and interdependent. For her, bad faith is the result of ignoring, 
denying, masking, and resisting ambiguity. By accepting ambiguity, we can capture the 
complexity of human interaction, and avoid the problem that occurs in Sartre’s philosophy 
that makes it impossible to establish a subject–subject relationship. Beauvoir’s approach to 
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our-being-in-the-world, anchored in ambiguity and intersubjectivity, departs from the 
dichotomous and individualistic ontology of many traditional philosophers – including 
existentialist philosophers such as Sartre, Kierkegaard, and Camus (Pettersen 2008; 2010). 
Beauvoir’s ontology is what opens up the prospect of authentic love in her philosophy, a 
possibility she consistently defends throughout her entire output. Additionally, her unique 
ontology and her understanding of authentic interaction also foreshadow tenets in 
contemporary feminist philosophy.  
 
4. Relational Autonomy 
Acknowledgement of one’s own and the other’s freedom and otherness, which Beauvoir 
asserts is mandatory to authentic love, is closely related to having autonomy or being 
autonomous. When Beauvoir describes the interaction in authentic love relationships, she is 
actually portraying people with autonomy. They have their own reasons, their self-defined 
goals, and they are both responsible for their own decisions and actions.  
 However, it has been regarded as one of the many paradoxes of love that the lovers 
are strongly motivated to form and constitute a “we,” while they also desire to remain 
autonomous – an antagonism Beauvoir describes both in Diary and The Second Sex. In her 
depictions of authentic love Beauvoir, nevertheless (and contrary to Sartre) surpasses this 
supposed antagonism between self-determination and cooperation, between independence 
and attachment when she describes a romantic relationship in which the parties manage to 
establish a “we” – without losing their individuality or erasing the boundaries between their 
two selves. In this sense, she rejects the view that a complete union must be the goal or is the 
nature of true love, and also the view that we are destined to remain solitary and isolated if 
we do not want to be dominated or dominating.  
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 According to Beauvoir, although couples in an authentic love relationship do not 
merge into complete union, obliterating their separate ego-boundaries, they can still form a 
“we.” There are, indeed, significant differences between the “we” constituted in authentic and 
inauthentic relationships. In an authentic relationship, says Beauvoir, the couple should not 
be considered as a unit, or “a closed cell,” but instead as free individuals capable also of 
participating in society and forming relationship with other free persons. And, she continues:  
 
This balanced couple is not a utopia; such couples exist, sometimes even within 
marriage, most often outside of it: some are united by a great sexual love that leaves 
them free in their friendships and occupation, others are linked by a friendship that 
does not hamper their sexual freedom, more rarely there are still others who are both 
lovers and friends but without seeking in each other their exclusive reason for living. 
(TSS 520/LDS II:286) 
 
The differences between the two types of “we” are worth exploring, as they shed light on an 
interesting understanding of autonomy in Beauvoir’s philosophy. The authentic “we” is not 
understood as if joined by a mysterious, natural, divine or conventional intervention; external 
forces do not bind them. What constitutes an authentic “we” is the voluntary decision of the 
two to set common goals, create values and share some experiences together. This consensus 
forms an autonomous “we.”  
 However, as autonomy has traditionally been understood in terms of separation, non-
interference, and self-determination, the concept does not grasp such shared agency. 
Beauvoir’s authentic love includes reciprocity, discussion, connectedness, and collaboration. 
Therefore, it represents a challenge to the traditional concept of autonomy. Under the 
traditional view of autonomy, one of the persons in an inauthentic relationship, usually the 
woman, has to give up his or her autonomy in order to constitute a “we,” while both 
individuals in an authentic relationship have to abandon their autonomy to become a “we” in 
which they are equal. Given this perspective on autonomy, the woman who wants to live an 
autonomous life would seem obliged to give up any idea of being in a heterosexual 
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relationship, while the man will only keep his autonomy in an inauthentic relationship. What 
is needed is a new concept of autonomy with space for the type of reciprocity and 
connectedness that we find in authentic love relationships – but without forfeiting self-
determination or freedom.  
 As Beauvoir is not willing to choose between individual self-determination and the 
possibility of authentic love, we find what is needed to reconceptualize autonomy in her 
version of authentic love. Beauvoir gives us an alternative understanding of autonomy 
because the self she portrays as capable of authentic love is both separate and relational, with 
the capacity to cooperate and to self-legislate. It is not a self that dominates others, nor does it 
allow itself be dominated or torn apart. Based on such selves, the “we” formed in authentic 
love is a democratic relationship in the sense that it is freely chosen and maintained by 
equals, with the capacity and space for genuine, open and mutual consultation, debate, and 
(dis)agreement (Westlund 2005, 30).  
 Not only is the ability to enter into such a relation a precondition for forming and 
maintaining the kind of relationship Beauvoir portrays as an authentic love relationship. We 
can also read her understanding of authentic love as a forerunner of feminist philosophy’s 
remodeling of the traditional concept of autonomy, which proceeded from what is termed an 
“individual” understanding to a “relational” understanding. Beauvoir’s authentic relationship 
is based on “comradeship;” it is not “parasitic.” Authentic love “presupposes friendship;” 
hence it “may be platonic as well as sexual,” she admits. Still, physical love is commonly a 
significant part of authentic love, as it is often what gives the “beloved its matchless value” 
and what maintains “their mutual magic” (Beauvoir 2015a, 78–9).  
 In the view of feminist ethicists such as Marilyn Friedmann (2005), Sarah Hoagland 
(1988), Virginia Held (1993), and Eva Kittay (1999), relational autonomy incorporates, in 
accordance with Beauvoir’s way of doing philosophy, the lived experience of relationships. 
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Based on many people’s everyday experiences, it is precisely through interacting with others 
that one learns how to make decisions. In relationships, one discusses who will make certain 
decisions, and from time to time the parties freely agree to let one or the other do so. This is 
done without undermining either party’s autonomy, or curbing their freedom. In fact, their 
cooperation might strengthen each individual’s autonomy (Held 1993, 55). Based on an 
agreement, a joint autonomy is possible. This reconceptualized notion of autonomy is indeed 
very different from the traditional notion that privileges non-intervention and self-sufficiency.  
 Not only does Beauvoir challenge the traditional philosophical conception of love and 
autonomy, she lays the foundations for the development of a new concept of autonomy 
within contemporary feminist philosophy. In her analysis of the two different kinds of love 
she suggests how it is possible to enter into a genuine love relationship in which we get to 
retain our autonomous lives, while enjoying shared and vibrant lives together. For love to be 
experienced in this manner, both sexes must forfeit the patriarchal view of gender and love. 
For authentic love to be possible, both women and men must unconditionally acknowledge 
themselves and their partner as unique and equal, and – it goes without saying – they must act 
accordingly. The friendship, generosity and love achieved by such mutual recognition of 
freedoms are, according to Beauvoir, undoubtedly humans’ highest accomplishment (TSS 
159–60/LDS I:232). What is attained is not only an authentically moral attitude, as well as 











1 Beauvoir also uses literature to explore the traditional gender differences with regard to 
love. In her novel The Mandarins (1954), for example, she lets the relationship 
between Paula and Henri epitomize gendered, inauthentic love. Paula has given up her 
own career as a singer to devote herself completely to her husband Henri – the 
founder and editor of a newspaper. Paula’s existence and identity are defined and 
dependent on her relationship with Henri. When he leaves her, Paula contemplates 
suicide. Beauvoir considers the consequences of inauthentic love also in other works, 
such as She Came to Stay (1943), and The Woman Destroyed (1967). 
2 Women’s inauthentic love as described in The Second Sex resembles several of Beauvoir’s 
portrayal of the possible inauthentic existences in The Ethic of Ambiguity (1947), such 
as the “sub-man”, the “serious man” and the “passionate man”. 
3 In addition, women conforming with traditional gendered expectations are also rewarded 
economically, metaphysically, and socially (Beauvoir 2011, 10). 
4 It should be mentioned that Sartre appends a footnote in which he says: “These 
considerations do not exclude the possibility of an ethics of deliverance and salvation. 
But this can be achieved only after a radical conversation which we cannot discuss 
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